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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a neoclassical growth model with non-unitary discount-
ing, where an individual discounts her future utilities from consumption and leisure
dierently. Because this non-unitary discounting induces the individual's preference
reversals, we regard one individual as being composed of dierent selves. Then we
derive the closed-form solution of the recursive competitive equilibrium in which her
dierent selves behave in a time-consistent way in all periods. With regard to welfare
analysis, we obtain the following three main results. First, the selves in any period
strictly prefer the planning allocation to the laissez-faire allocation if they are given
the same value of a state variable in both situations. Second, the selves in the long
run can prefer the latter to the former allocation if we focus on the overall equilibrium
paths in both situations. Third, a time-consistent tax policy designed by a benevolent
government replicates the planning allocation.
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1 Introduction
Father: \Could you mow the yard tomorrow instead of playing football? After
completing the job, I will give you $20."
Son: \Really? I will. Then, I can buy a new computer game!"
Tomorrow has come.
Father: \Why are you going out to play football? Mow the yard! You promised
yesterday, didn't you?"
Son: \Sorry Dad. I no longer think $20 is enough for the job."
Why did the boy break his promise? Is it because he is a liar? Of course, there are a
number of possible answers to this question. One possibility, suggested by a large body of
experimental evidence, is that preference reversals frequently occur over time in people's
decision-making. As such, it could be that the boy rst felt that $20 (or purchasing the
new game) was preferable, but by the following day, preferred his leisure activity.
Although the aforementioned explanation gives one hypothetical answer to the question,
it becomes convincing once we consider the domain eect, or domain independence, often
referred to in experimental psychology literature. The domain eect emerges when the
discount rates (or factors) dier depending on their domains.1 In the above example, the
domain eect emerges if the boy discounts the utilities from the monetary reward ($20)
and from enjoying the leisure activity (football) dierently. For expositional convenience,
let R denote the utility from the monetary reward and F denote the utility from the leisure
activity. We assume R < F . That is, the boy will never mow the yard if he asked to do
so right now. Next, suppose that, on the rst day, he evaluates the utility from receiving
$20 as 1R, and that from playing football as 2F , where 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 2 (0; 1) are
the discount factors specic to the monetary reward and leisure, respectively. Then, if the
boy discounts enjoying leisure steeply enough that 1R > 2F , he will accept his father's
job oer on the rst day.
Hereafter, we refer to such domain-specic discounting as non-unitary discounting. If
an individual discounts her future utilities in a non-unitary way, this can make her decisions
time inconsistent. There has been a recent upsurge of interest in models of time-inconsistent
1Chapman (1996), based on experimental studies, notes that the discount rates may be specic to
money and health. See also Chapman, Nelson, and Hier (1999) and Chapman, Brewer, and Leventhal
(2001). On the other hand, Soman (2004) and Zauberman and Lynch (2005) show that dierent discount
rates may apply to time and money. Recently, using survey data from Uganda and both hypothetical and
incentivized choices over dierent goods, Ubfal (2014) shows that equal discount rates across goods are not
supported empirically. For an excellent discussion on the inconsistency of intertemporal choices due to time
discounting, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002).
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preferences, as pioneered by Strotz (1955{56) and Pollak (1968). In this context, the
individual's decision-making process is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game
played by her dierent selves, where the current self is aware that her preferences might
change in future, and makes the current decision taking this into account.2 However, much
of the literature focuses on a class of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, rst proposed by Phelps
and Pollak (1968), and made popular by Laibson (1996, 1997).3 Therefore, the purpose of
this paper is to develop a simple dynamic theory of non-unitary discounting.
We incorporate non-unitary discounting into a discrete-time neoclassical growth model
with endogenous labor supply. Then, we assume that an individual discounts her one-
period utility functions of consumption and leisure dierently. Therefore, as the boy does
in the earlier example, the individual changes her mind about the relative importance of
consumption and leisure as time progresses. There are very few studies on non-unitary
discounting.4 Compared with them, our formulation has such an advantage that the ap-
plicability of dynamic programming enables us to derive the closed-form solution of the
recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE)
Within this framework, we conduct a welfare analysis to consider the central question of
this paper, namely whether a policy intervention is desirable for the individual. The answer
to this question is no longer straightforward, because as a result of a lack of commitment,
each self of the social planner is also involved in strategic interactions with her other selves.
In fact, in their model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith
(2002) show that the allocation in the RCE surprisingly attains strictly higher welfare
than that in the planning allocation. More recently, Hiraguchi (2014) extends Krusell et
al. to a general model of non-constant discounting, including the original as a special case,
and shows that their result is robust. At the same time, a welfare comparison between
the competitive and planning economies gives rise to the following problem. In order
to correctly identify which achieves higher welfare in each period, we must control the
2For example, see Peleg and Yaari (1973) and Goldman (1980) for the game-theoretic foundations of the
solution concepts in Strotz (1955{56) and Pollak (1968).
3Applications based on quasi-hyperbolic discounting now cover a broad range of topics, including con-
sumption and saving decisions (Laibson, 1996; 1997; Krusell and Smith, 2003), labor supply decisions
(DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005), and optimal taxation (Krusell, Kurusu, and Smith, 2002), among oth-
ers.
4 By formulating a continuous-time model of non-unitary discounting, Futagami and Hori (2010) derive
the equilibrium strategies of an interpersonal game in the same way as Barro (1999). However, they assume
away capital accumulation and, thereby, overlook how the dynamics of state variables aect the equilibrium
paths of the game. In an accompanying paper, Hori and Futagami (2013) incorporate capital accumulation
and a learning-by-doing externality into the model. They then investigate the interactions among devel-
opment, patience, and saving behaviors. However, although they provide important explanations to some
empirically observed results, they do not perform any welfare analyses.
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dierence in the dynamics of the state variables between the two economies. Namely, we
can not evaluate which of the economies performs better if we focus only on their overall
equilibrium paths.5
To overcome this problem, we conduct the welfare comparison in two distinct ways,
namely by considering both on- and o-paths of the market economy and the planning
economy. First, we consider the hypothetical situation that, in an arbitrarily given period,
a self faces the same value of a state variable in both economies. Our analysis within this
framework shows that the welfare to the self in the social planning case is always strictly
higher than that in the RCE. This means that welfare improvement is always possible from
the realized allocation in the RCE, which contrasts sharply with the ndings of Krusell et
al. (2002).
Then, we conduct a welfare comparison between the overall equilibrium paths of the
two economies. We show that it depends on the relative degree of impatience whether or
not the planning allocation is more Pareto ecient than the allocation in the RCE. The
following two cases arise. If the individual discounts future leisure more steeply than she
does future consumption, the planning allocation is preferable to the laissez-faire allocation
for all selves. However, if the reverse is true, they are not Pareto ranked. We show that
there exists a unique threshold period such that, before this period, any selves strictly
prefer the planning allocation. However, after this period, they strictly prefer the laissez-
faire allocation. This means that the allocation in the RCE may achieve a more desirable
outcome than the social planner does for the selves in later periods.
In addition, we incorporate a government's activity in the baseline model. Assuming
that the government imposes taxes on savings, wages, and interest income, and that it can
not commit to its future policies as the social planner, we show that the time-consistent
tax policy replicates the allocation by the social planner. However, this result makes it
dicult to judge the validity of government interventions. If an individual discounts future
leisure more steeply than she does future consumption, the implementation of such a policy
is Pareto improving. However, if the reverse is true, the second result means that the time-
consistent tax policy is preferred by the selves in earlier periods, but not in later periods.
This makes it dicult to resolve the intertemporal conict for individuals when there are
no commitment mechanisms.
As already stated, the most closely related literature to our study is the set of studies
on time-inconsistent preferences resulting from non-geometric discounting. However, our
model is also related to a class of preferences exhibiting temptations. Among others,
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) consider a two-period, many-good economy, and classify
the goods into two types. The rst is a standard good, the consumption of which in both
5In Section 4.4 (pp. 56) of their paper, Krusell et al. make the same argument.
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periods attains the individual's lifetime utility in period 1. The second is a \temptation
good," the consumption of which in period 2 is not valued in period 1, but becomes to
attain utility once period 2 has come. In their two-period model, temptation goods are
interpreted as those with a discount factor of 0. If we set 2 = 0 in the example at the
beginning of the introduction, playing football is a temptation good for the boy. Thus, our
model of non-unitary discounting is closely related to their notion of temptation.6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the simple
neoclassical growth model with non-unitary discounting, and explains the mechanism of
the time inconsistency in the model. Section 3 formulates the individual's decision-making
as a dynamic intrapersonal game and characterizes the RCE. Section 4 solves the social
planner's intrapersonal game, and examines the welfare implications of the RCE. In this
section, we also explain the intuitions behind our results, and discuss how they dier from
the results in models that use other types of discounting. Then, Section 5 introduces the
government's tax policy, and derives the time-consistent tax policy. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 A Macroeconomic Model of Non-unitary Discounting
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; : : : For simplicity, we assume there is no un-
certainty. There exists a unit mass of homogenous individuals, each of whom is endowed
with one unit of working time in each period. Let ct and lt denote the individual's con-
sumption and labor supply, respectively. In our model, we assume that in period t  0,
the individual's preference is given by the following utility function:
Ut =
1X
i=0

(c)
iuc(ct+i) + (l)
iul(lt+i)

; (1)
where uc and ul denote the one-period (dis)utility functions of consumption and labor
supply, respectively. Then, c 2 (0; 1) and l 2 (0; 1) are the discount factors of con-
sumption and labor supply, respectively. As is clear from (1), if c = l, we have the
preferences of standard geometric discounting.7 In contrast, when c 6= l, a problem of
time inconsistency may emerge, as explained in the introduction.
Our purpose is to obtain the implications of non-unitary discounting in a neoclassical
growth model with endogenous labor supply. Hereafter, the one-period utility functions,
6 In other words, in the model of Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010), time inconsistency occurs. In
contrast, as is well known, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) propose a utility function (and give its axiomatic
foundations) that exhibits temptation, but that is free from time inconsistency.
7Exponential discounting, which is the continuous-time counterpart of geometric discounting, was orig-
inally posited by Samuelson (1937).
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uc and ul, are specied as
uc(c) = ln c; ul(l) =  ln(1  l);
where  > 0 is a constant that governs the weight on the utility from leisure. Assuming
that capital fully depreciates after production in each period, the ow budget constraint
of the individual is
kt+1 = rtkt + wtlt   ct; (2)
where k denotes the individual's holding of capital stock, and r and w represent the rental
price of capital and the wage rate, respectively.
The production function takes a Cobb{Douglas form, Yt = AK

t L
1 
t , where Y , K, and
L denote the amount of output, demand for capital, and demand for labor, respectively.8
Then, A > 0 is the level of total factor productivity and  2 (0; 1) is a constant which
species the share of capital income in total output. Let Xt  Kt=Lt denote the ratio of
aggregate demand for capital to that for labor. Then, perfect competition results in
rt = r(Xt)  AX 1t ; wt = w(Xt)  A(1  )Xt : (3)
We rst describe the decision-making of the individual who does not consider the pos-
sibility of time-inconsistency. Solving the individual's dynamic optimization problem, and
substituting (3) and the market clearing conditions, Kt = kt and Lt = lt, into the resulting
equations, we have
ct=ct 1 = cA (kt=lt) (1 ) ; (4)
ct=(1  lt) = (c=l)t (1  )A (kt=lt) : (5)
Then, we guess the following saving decision for the individual: kt+1 = sk

t l
1 
t , where s
is the variable still to be solved. Substituting this guess and c = (1  s)Akl1  into (4),
we obtain s = c. On the other hand, by applying this result to (5), we obtain
lt =
1  
1  + (1  c) (l=c)t
: (6)
Thus, when l > (<)c, labor supply decreases (increases) over time and approaches zero
(one). This is because when l > (<)c, the individual puts more (less) weight on the
utility of future leisure than on that of future consumption. In this case, he or she supplies
less (more) labor over time.
8Thus, in specifying the functional forms, we basically follow Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002), who
restrict their attention to the case of log one-period utility functions and a Cobb{Douglas production
technology, with complete depreciation of physical capital after the production in each period.
5
Does the individual follow these decisions after the initial period? The answer is no. If
the individual again solves the problem at time t, he or she does not supply lt, but instead
will supply
l0 =
1  
1  + (1  c) :
For example, consider the case of l < c, i.e., the individual puts less weight on future
leisure. Consequently, he or she initially plans to supply more labor in the future periods.
However, when the future period comes, he or she prefers to enjoy the leisure activity, as
the boy did in the introduction, and supplies less labor.
3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
As claried in the previous section, as long as c 6= l, the individual will change her
mind about the relative importance between consumption and leisure as time progresses.
Thus, if she could commit to her future decisions, she would do so. However, in our real
economic life, it is sometimes not possible for consumers to commit to their future actions.
In this section, we characterize the recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) by making the
restriction that commitment can not be achieved.
First, note that the utility function given in (1) is expressed as
Ut = uc(ct) + ul(lt)
+ c
h
uc(ct+1) + cuc(ct+2) + (c)
2uc(ct+3) + : : :
i
+ l
h
ul(lt+1) + lul(lt+2) + (l)
2ul(lt+3) + : : :
i
:
Dene Uj;t+1  uj(jt+1)+juj(jt+2)+(j)2uj(jt+3)+ : : : , where j = c; l. Then, the above
expression gives the following formula:
Ut = uc(ct) + ul(lt) + cUc;t+1 + lUl;t+1: (7)
In what follows, the variables in the next (current) period are represented by those with
(without) a prime. For example, we use k0 and k rather than kt+1 and kt, respectively.
The individual's budget constraint is now expressed as
k0 = r(X)k + w(X)l   c;
where r(X) and w(X) are given in (3).
Now we are in position to state the individual's time-consistent decision-making. How-
ever, we rst need to make a few assumptions. First, we assume the individual, in any
given period, is aware of her preference for change, and makes her current decision taking
this into account. Therefore, her decision-making process is formulated as a dynamic game
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played by her dierent selves. Second, we focus on Markov strategies such that each self
makes a decision based on the values of individual state k and the aggregate capital{labor
ratio, X. Third, each self rationally perceives the law of motion of X and her next self's
decisions, given by
X 0 = G(X); k00 = g(k0; X 0); l0 = l(k0; X 0);
where G, g, and l are functions still to be solved. Finally, we seek a stationary equilibrium
in which the functional forms of g, l, and G are time invariant.
Applying the above assumptions to (7), the current self's problem is given by the
following Bellman equation:
V (k;X) = max
k0;l
n
ln
 
r(X)k + w(X)l   k0+  ln(1  l)
+ cVc
 
k0; G(X)

+ lVl
 
k0; G(X)
o
; (8)
where function V is the value function associated with the problem given in (8), and Vc
and Vl are recursively dened by the following functional equations:
Vc(k;X) = ln (r(X)k + w(X)l(k;X)  g(k;X)) + cVc (g(k;X); G(X)) ; (9)
Vl(k;X) = ln(1  l(k;X)) + lVl (g(k;X); G(X)) : (10)
We denote the solution to the problem in (8) as eg(k;X) and el(k;X). The stationary
equilibrium requires eg = g and el = l, for all (k;X) in the domains of g and l. Note that
(8){(10) jointly exhibit a recursive formulation of the maximization problem. Thus, we
can solve the problem using a dynamic programming technique.
Then, the stationary RCE is dened as follows:
Denition 1. The stationary RCE is given by the value functions Vj (j = c; l), the current
self 's decision rules g and l, the law of motion for the aggregate capital{labor ratio G, and
the factor prices r and w, such that
1. Given g(k;X) and l(k;X), Vc(k;X) and Vl(k;X) solve the functional equations (9)
and (10), respectively;
2. The current self 's decision rules are stationary Markov perfect: that is, g(k;X) and
l(k;X) solve the problem given in (8);
3. The decision rules g(k;X) and l(k;X) are consistent with their aggregate counter-
parts;
g(K;K=L) = G(K=L)L0; l(K;K=L) = L:
4. The factor prices r(X) and w(X) are given by (3).
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Since r(X) and w(X) are already given, our task is to obtain the functions Vj , g, l, and
G that satisfy properties 1{3. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The RCE is given by
1. Vj(k;X) = aj + bj lnX + dj ln(k + 'X), with bj dj and ' given by
bc =   1  
(1  c)(1  c) ; dc =
1
1  c ; bl =  
1
1  l ; dl =
1
1  l ;
' =
1  

1 +  +	
1 + 
;
where 	 is dened as
	  c
1  c + 
l
1  l ; (11)
2. g(k;X) and l(k;X) are given by
g(k;X) =
	
1 +  +	
r(X)k; l(k;X) = 1  r(X)
w(X)

1 +  +	
(k + 'X); (12)
3. G(X) = seAX, where
se  	
1 +  +	
: (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that in Denition 1 and Proposition 1, k and X are arbitrarily given. This means
the RCE characterizes an individual's optimal decisions both on and o the resulting
equilibrium path, which is analogous to a subgame-perfect equilibrium of extensive-form
games. Furthermore, the stationarity of the RCE means that g and l can give any selves'
optimal decisions once we enter the values of (k;X). Thus, the RCE given in Proposition
1 can give an individual's optimal decision in any state and in any period.
Next, we derive the path of the recursive competitive equilibrium (hereafter, RCE
path). On the RCE path, rms' aggregate capital (labor) demand K (L) is equal to the
supply k (l). Substituting (3) and X = k=L into (12), we have
L = l(k; k=L), L = 1  
1  

1 +  +	
(L+ '):
Substituting ' in Proposition 1 into the above equation, we obtain the equilibrium em-
ployment, as follows:
L = le  (1  )(1 +  +	)
(1 + )[ + (1  )(1 + 	)] : (14)
Hence, from (13) and (14), we obtain the RCE path.
Lemma 1. Given k0 > 0, the RCE path is given by the sequence fket g1t=0, such that
ket+1 = G(k
e
t =l
e)le  seA(ket )(le)1 :
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Before turning to a welfare analysis in this model, we investigate the characteristics of
the RCE. First, we examine how the RCE path is inuenced by changes in c and l. From
the denition in (11), 	 is strictly increasing with respect to both c and l. On the other
hand, from (13) and (14), both se and le are strictly increasing functions of 	. Therefore,
these properties are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. On the RCE path, the saving rate and the labor supply are strictly increasing
functions of j (j = c; l).
Second, we analyze whether the observational equivalence holds across the model with
our non-unitary discounting preferences and those with the standard geometric discounting
preferences. To that end, consider an economy in the same environment as ours, except
that the representative individual's preference is given by
P1
t=0 
t[ln ct +  ln(1  lt)]. The
equilibrium path of this economy is given by the sequence fk^tg1t=0, such that
k^t+1 = A(k^t)
(l^)1 ; (15)
l^ =
1  
1  + (1  ) : (16)
Then, we obtain (15) and (16) by imposing c = l =  on (6).
For expositional convenience, let ^  	=(1 +  +	). From (13) and (15), we nd that
the saving rate becomes the same in these two models if  = ^. Furthermore, substituting
this result in to (16), we have
l^ =
1  
1  + (1  ^) =
(1  )(1 +  +	)
(1  )(1 +  +	) +  [(1 +  +	) 	]
=
(1  )(1 +  +	)
(1 + )[ + (1  )(1 + 	)] :
Then, (16) becomes (14) if  = ^. This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given 	 (i.e., c and l), the RCE path in this model becomes observa-
tionally equivalent to that in the standard growth model, with the discount factor given by
	=(1 +  +	).
By incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting into a simple neoclassical growth model,
Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) show that the observational equivalence holds between
their model and the standard geometric discounting model.9 Barro (1999) shows the same
property in his continuous-time model of non-constant rate of time preferences. Proposition
2 in our paper states that the observational equivalence holds between our non-unitary
discounting and the standard discounting. At rst glance, this result appears to show
that the standard model, or the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, can replicate all
9See Proposition 2 of their paper.
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our ndings. However, this is not correct because, as we show in the next section, our
model proposes welfare implications that dier markedly from those of the aforementioned
underlying preferences.
4 Welfare Implications
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of the RCE in our non-unitary discount-
ing model. To this end, we rst investigate the planning problem. The social planner's
preferences are the same as those of the individual in Section 3, and she can not commit
to her future selves' decisions. As in the case with the RCE, we model this situation as an
intrapersonal game played among dierent selves of the planner. Then, we compare the
RCE and the social planning in terms of resulting welfare.
4.1 Social Planning Problem
Note that, in contrast to the market economy in Section 3, the planner can directly aect
the resource constraint by her decisions. This is because she knows that the aggregate
variables must coincide with their corresponding variables for each individual (i.e., (K;L) =
(k; l)).
Assume that the current planner expects that if the value of capital is given by k, the
next self's decisions of savings and labor supply are given by gsp(k) and lsp(k). As in the
case of the RCE, we focus on the case in which the functional forms of gsp and lsp are
stationary. Therefore, the problem of the current planner is given by
V sp(k) = max
k0;l

ln(Akl1    k0) +  ln(1  l) + cV spc (k0) + lV spl (k0)
	
; (17)
where V spc (k) and V
sp
l (k) are, respectively, given by the following functional equations:
V spc (k) = ln

Ak(lsp(k))1    gsp(k)+ cV spc (gsp(k)); (18)
V spl (k) = ln(1  lsp(k)) + lV spl (gsp(k)): (19)
Then, we arrive at the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The Markov-perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal game among the dierent
selves of the social planner is given by lsp(k) = lsp and gsp(k) = sspAk(lsp)1 , where
ssp = c; (20)
lsp =
1  
1  + (1  c) : (21)
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Once the social planner's time-consistent decision rule is given by (gsp(k); lsp), the
outcome path of the social planning is given by the sequence fkspt g1t=0, such that kspt+1 =
gsp(kspt ), with historically given k0. Since l does not aect s
sp or lsp, we can immediately
show the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under the assumptions of log one-period utility and the Cobb{Douglas
production function, the social planner's time-consistent decision-making is intrinsically
the same as those who discount their future consumption and leisure equally.
As stated explicitly in this proposition, this result owes much to the specications of
the functional forms. Nevertheless, we think that this proposition is noteworthy, because in
the RCE with the same specications, this result does not hold but only the observational
equivalence holds.
The intuition behind this proposition is explained as follows. First, note that in any
given period, the current self can inuence the next self's decisions only by choosing k0, the
value of which corresponds to the decision node used in game theory. This is a common
characteristic in models of intrapersonal games. However, as Lemma 3 shows, the value
of lsp does not depend on capital in this model.10 Furthermore, the planner perceives
this result. Then, the current planner gives up trying to control her next self's labor
supply, and instead tries to manipulate her next self's savings by choosing her own saving
decision. Since the model exhibits standard geometric discounting when we focus only
on the utility from consumption, such decision-making induces the standard result for
intertemporal optimization. This is the reason why the saving rate in our non-unitary
discounting model becomes the same as that in the standard model when we consider
the social planner's decision-making. Finally, since the saving behaviors are the same
between these two models, the amount of physical capital in all periods is the same as well.
Therefore, the constant value of the labor supply in our model is essentially determined by
the same value as that in the standard discounting model.
4.2 Welfare Comparison: Preliminary Results
Having characterized the decision-making by dierent selves of the social planner, we now
conduct a welfare comparison between the RCE and the social planning. In doing so, we
rst consider a hypothetical situation in which, for an arbitrarily given period, a self in
both economies faces the same value of the state variable, k. Of course, since se 6= ssp and
le 6= lsp, the economies experience dierent dynamic equilibrium paths, even if their initial
values of physical capital are equal (see Lemma 1 and Lemma 3). Nevertheless, to consider
such a situation is important for two reasons. First, as is well known, in models with
10This result is directly the result of the specications of the functional forms.
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preference reversals, we must consider the welfare of the selves in arbitrary periods, not
only in the initial period. Second, in order to correctly identify which allocation achieves
higher welfare, the RCE or the social planning, we must impose a control on the dierence
in the state variable kt, because otherwise the dierence in the state would itself bring
about a dierence in welfare.
An individual's welfare with her state given by k is V sp(k) in the social planning,
whereas it is V e(k) in the RCE, where V e(k) is dened as
V e(k)  V (k; k=le):
Briey, V e(k) is the welfare evaluated when the market equilibrium conditions (K = k; L =
le) are imposed.
Our analysis essentially follows that of Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002), and pro-
ceeds by taking the following three steps. First, we dene the following welfare evaluation
function, W :
W (s; l; k)  1
1  c ln(1  s) +

1  l ln(1  l)
+

1  c ln k +
1
(1  c)(1  c) [c ln s+ lnA+ (1  ) ln l] : (22)
The derivation of W (s; l; k) is given in Appendix C. Intuitively, W (s; l; k) is obtained by
evaluating the individual's utility after imposing c = (1   s)Akl1  and k0 = sAkl1 .
Thus, by its denition, the following identity holds:
V x(k) W (sx; lx; k); x = e; sp:
Second, we show that there exists a unique (s; l) that maximizes W (s; l; k). Since
this function in (22) is strictly concave in (s; l), the necessary and sucient conditions for
(s; l) are given by
1
1  c
1
1  s =
c
(1  c)(1  c)
1
s
;

1  l
1
1  l =
1  
(1  c)(1  c)
1
l
:
Therefore, we have
s = c; (23)
l =
(1  )(1  l)
(1  )(1  l) + (1  c)(1  c) : (24)
Finally, we complete the analysis by checking which of V e(k) and V sp(k) is nearer to
W (s; l; k). We can show the following lemma.
Lemma 4. ssp( s) R se and l R lsp R le if and only if c R l:
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(a) Case of c > l (b) Case of l > c
Figure 1: Contours of W and the relationship among (s; l), (se; le), and (ssp; lsp)
Proof. Recall that if c = l, (s
e; le) = (ssp; lsp) = (s; l). From (13), (20), (23), and the
result obtained in Lemma 2 that se is increasing in l, we can show that s
sp  s R se ,
c R l: On the other hand, from (14), (21), (24) and the result in Lemma 2 that le is
increasing in l, we can show that l
 R lsp R le , c R l:
Having obtained Lemma 4, we graphically examine which achieves the higher welfare
in the (s, l)-plane. In panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1, (s; l) is located at point O, and
the closed curves represent the indierence curves. The value of the welfare evaluation
function W (s; l; k) increases as the curves approach O. At any point on the curve passing
through point A (B), V e(k) (V sp(k)) is achieved. From Lemma 4, the distance from point
A to point O is necessarily farther than that from point B to point O, as long as c 6= l.
Furthermore, from this lemma, we can show that points A and B are located in the same
quadrant of the coordinate plane, with its origin given by point O. This means that when
c 6= l, the indierence curve passing through point A is always located outside the curve
passing through point B. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that c 6= l. Then, V e(k) < V sp(k) holds for all k > 0.
Consider an economy that starts in a given period t with its state given by k. Propo-
sition 4 shows that as long as c 6= l, the social planning always achieves higher welfare
than the RCE, given any t and k. This result contrasts sharply with the ndings of Krusell,
Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) who show that the RCE always performs better than the plan-
ning economy in their quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. Recently, Hiraguchi (2014)
extended the work of Krusell et al. to a more general model of non-constant discount-
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ing, including the original work as a special case, and showed that their result is robust.
Therefore, the ndings of Hiraguchi (2014) make our results stand out even further.
The intuition behind this result is explained as follows. We simplify the discussion by
focusing on the case of l > c, which induces the situation in which the current self wants
her future selves to enjoy leisure more than they actually do. Note that this gives the
current self an incentive to save more amount of the goods. Note too that this strategic
aspect potentially works in both the RCE and the social planning. However, in the latter
economy, such a strategic interaction has no impact on the resulting allocation, since the
planner perceives that she can not manipulate her future selves' labor supply, as explained
in the previous subsection. Accordingly, both ssp and lsp are free from this intrapersonal
strategic interaction. In contrast, in the RCE, a next self's labor supply decision is l(k0; X 0),
which can be predicted by the current self. Then, motivated by a desire for self-control,
the current self's saving rate is excessively high.
4.3 Welfare Comparison of Equilibrium Paths
As already noted, the RCE and the social planning generate dierent equilibrium sequences
of physical capital. On the equilibrium path, fkxt g1t=0, for x = e; sp, the welfare of a self in
period t is given by V x(kxt ). Since k
e
0 = k
sp
0 = k0, Proposition 4 indicates that the welfare
of the initial self is always higher in the social planning than it is in the RCE. Then, does
this result apply to the other selves?
First, we consider the case of c > l, where s
e < ssp and le < lsp are satised. Since
the solution of the dierence equation kxt = s
xA(kxt 1)(lx)1  is given by
kxt = exp

t ln k0 +
1  t
1   ln

sxA(lx)1 

; (25)
it follows that
ket < k
sp
t 8t = 1; 2; : : :
On the other hand, from Proposition 4, we have already shown that V e(k) < V sp(k), for
all k. Furthermore, we can readily show the following lemma.
Lemma 5. V x(k) is strictly increasing in k for both x = e and x = sp.
Proof. From the identity V x(k)  W (sx; lx; k) and the denition of W in (22), V x(k) is
expressed as
V x(k) =

1  c ln k +A
x;
where Ax is a collection of other terms, independent of k. The above equation shows that
V x(k) is strictly increasing in k.
Therefore, we have the following proposition, which shows that the allocation on the
RCE path is Pareto dominated by that of the social planning.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that c > l. Then, V
e(ket ) < V
sp(kspt ) 8t = 0; 1; 2 : : :
Next, consider the case of l > c. From the foregoing analysis, the following inequality
then holds:
ket > k
sp
t 8t = 1; 2; : : :
Since V e(k) < V sp(k) holds for all k in this case, the welfare comparison is not straight-
forward. Therefore, we rst focus on the welfare comparison of the steady states.
When the saving rate and labor supply are constant over time, the steady-state value
of physical capital is given by
k = Kss(s; l)  (sA)
1
1  l: (26)
Thus, the steady state of k in the RCE is Kss(s
e; le), while that in the social planning is
Kss(s
sp; lsp). On the other hand, we can dene the function, Wss(s; l), as follows:
Wss(s; l) W (s; l;Kss(s; l))
=
1
1  c ln
h
(1  s)s 1 A 11  l
i
+

1  l ln(1  l):
From the denition of Wss(s; l) and the identity V
x(k)  W (sx; lx; k), we can verify that
V x(Kss(s
x; lx)) Wss(sx; lx).
By a simple calculation, we nd that Wss(s; l) is maximized at (s

ss; l

ss), where
sss = ; l

ss =
1  l
1  l + (1  c) :
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Given c, there exists a unique l 2 (c; 1), such that ssp < se < sss and
lsp < le < lss if and only if c < l < l.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 4, we have ssp < se and lsp < le , l > c. Our
remaining task is to derive the condition under which se < sss and le < lss hold. From
the denition in (13), se converges to (= sss) as l ! 1. Since se is increasing in l,
se < sss, for all l 2 (0; 1). On the other hand, from the denition of le in (12), we have
that le converges to 1=(1 + ) as l = 1. Finally, from the above denition of l

ss, we have
lss = 1=(1 + ) when l = c, and lss ! 0 when l ! 1. Since le is increasing in l, there
exists a unique l 2 (c; 1), such that le < lss if and only if l < l. These results show
that this lemma is true.
The previous lemma shows that V e(Kss(s
e; le)) > V sp(Kss(s
sp; lsp)). In other words,
the RCE achieves a higher steady-state welfare than the social planning does if c < l < l.
On the other hand, it is ambiguous which achieves higher welfare if l > l: Therefore, we
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focus on the former situation. Since V e(k0) < V
sp(k0), there exists at least one T , such
that V e(ket ) > V
sp(kspt ) if t  T . Furthermore, in Appendix D, we show that this period
T is unique. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that c < l < l. Then, there exists a unique T
 > 0, such that
V e(ket ) > V
sp(kspt ) if and only if t  T :
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 6 states that the RCE allocation can achieve a more desirable outcome
than the social planner allocation for the selves in later periods. The intuition behind this
result is explained as follows. As already stated, when l > c in the RCE environment,
each self can not help saving excessively. Indeed, as shown in Proposition 4, this induces
a welfare loss to herself. However, such a decision by the current self is favorable for her
future selves, because their assets increase. Therefore, in terms of a welfare comparison
between the equilibrium paths, the RCE can be more desirable in the long run.
Based upon the above result, can we conclude that in the long run, the selves in a
laissez-faire environment (surprisingly) do better jobs than the social planner? We must
be cautious when answering this question, because as mentioned in Section 4.2, we must
control for the dierence in the state variable before discussing the eciency of the equilib-
rium. To clarify this point, we focus on the case of c < l < l. Then, from Propositions
4 and 6, there exists a period t  T , such that the following two inequalities are satised
simultaneously:
V sp(kspt ) < V
e(ket ) < V
sp(ket ):
The rst inequality comes from Proposition 6, which shows that the RCE is more desirable
than the social planning for the self in this period, because she has greater assets. On the
other hand, the second inequality is obtained from Proposition 4, and shows that, given ket ,
the self strictly prefers the allocation by the social planner to the allocation on the RCE
path. Thus, the RCE is suboptimal, and welfare improvement is always possible from
its realized allocation. This nding is the motivation for our interest in the possibility of
government intervention, which we examine in the next section.
5 Analysis of Tax Policies
Motivated by the results in the previous section, we now introduce the government's activity
into the competitive economy examined in Section 3. We assume that the government
imposes taxes on individuals' wage income, interest income, and savings. Our goal is to
design an optimal tax policy that is time consistent. However, before we do that, we must
rst qualitatively examine how the RCE is aected by the government taxes, when all tax
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rates are constant over time. This will provide us with a benchmark for the main analysis.
Then, we examine the optimal policy when the current government seeks to maximize the
current self's utility, but is not able to commit to its policies in future periods.
5.1 The RCE with a Time-invariant Tax Policy
Let r 2 (0; 1), w 2 (0; 1), and i  0 denote the rates of interest income, wage income,
and savings. The budget constraint of the individual now becomes
(1 + i)k
0 = (1  r)r(X)k + (1  w)w(X)l   c:
We further assume that there is no government expenditure and its budget must be bal-
anced in each period. Consequently, the government's budget constraint is given by
rr(X)K + ww(X)L+ iK
0 = 0: (27)
From (27), we can readily nd that one of the tax rates is determined by the other two rates.
Thus, we choose w and i as independent variables, which are denoted by  = (w; i).
As in the case of the laissez-faire environment in Section 3, each self rationally perceives
the law of motion for the aggregate demand of the capital{labor ratio, given by
X 0 = G(X;  ):
We guess that the labor supply on the RCE path is constant over time, based on the
result in Section 3. In that case, on the RCE path, the labor supply in any period is given
by the constant, le. Therefore, K 0 = G(X;  )L0 = G(X;  )L. This assumption is veried
to be true when we solve for the equilibrium. Then, from Eq. (27), r is given by
r = r(X;  )   ww(X) + iG(X;  )
r(X)X
: (28)
Next, we dene the following new functions:
r^(X;  ) = (1  r(X;  ))r(X); w^(X;  ) = (1  w)w(X);
and a new variable:
k^0 = (1 + i)k0:
We assume that the current self expects that its future selves' savings and labor supply
are given by k^00 = g(k0; X 0;  ) and l0 = l(k0; X 0;  ), respectively, where g governs the future
savings, including tax.
The current self's problem can be stated as follows:
V (k;X;  ) = max
k^0;l
n
ln

r^(X;  )k + w^(X;  )l   k^0

+  ln(1  l)
+ cVc

(1 + i)
 1k^0; G(X;  ); 

+lVl

(1 + i)
 1k^0; G(X;  ); 
o
; (29)
17
where the functions Vc and Vl satisfy the following functional equations:
Vc(k;X;  ) = ln (r^(X;  )k + w^(X;  )l(k;X;  )  g(k;X;  ))
+ cVc
 
(1 + i)
 1g(k;X;  ); G(X;  ); 

; (30)
Vl(k;X;  ) = ln(1  l(k;X;  )) + lVl
 
(1 + i)
 1g(k;X;  ); G(X;  ); 

: (31)
The RCE with government taxes is dened in the same manner as in Denition 1.
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7. The RCE with government taxes is given by
1. Vj(k;X;  ) = aj + bj lnX + dj ln(k + 'X), with bj and dj given by the same values
as in Proposition 1, but with ' now given by
' = 'et( )  (1  w)(1  )
+ w(1  )  set( ) ;
where
set( )  	[+ (1  )w]
	 + (1 + )(1 + i)
:
2. g(k;X;  ) and l(k;X;  ) are given by
g(k;X;  ) =
r^(X;  )
1 +  +	
(k + 'X); l(k;X;  ) = 1  
1 +  +	
r^(X;  )
w^(X;  )
(k + 'X);
respectively, where the value of 	 is same as in Proposition 1;
3. G(X;  ) = set( )AX.
Proof. See Appendix E.
In the same way as in Section 3, the labor supply on the RCE path is given by
let( ) =
(1  w)(1  )(1 +  +	)
(1 + )[(1 + set( )i) + (1  w)(1  )(1 + 	)] : (32)
The derivation of this equation is given in Appendix E.
5.2 A Time-consistent Tax Policy
In this section, we consider the case in which the government can not commit to its policies
at future dates. The timing of events is as follows:
1. Observing kt, the government sets (wt; it) so as to maximize the individual's utility;
2. Given (rt; wt) and (wt; it; rt), the individual and the rms make their decisions so
as to maximize their own objectives;
3. All markets clear. Thus, lt, ct, and the pair of factor prices (rt; wt) are determined;
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4. The values of rt and kt+1 are determined from the budget constraints of the indi-
vidual and the government.
Following Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002), we obtain the time-consistent optimal
tax policy using the one-shot deviation method. Suppose that the governments at all
future dates set their taxes as  = (w;  i). Then, suppose that the current government
unilaterally deviates from  and sets e = (ew; ei). Let eG(X; e ;  ) denote the law of motion
of X, which diers from G(X;  ) obtained in Lemma 7 owing to the current government's
one-period deviation. By denition, eG(X;  ;  )  G(X;  ) (i.e., if e =  , they are the
same function).
First, we consider the current individual's problem:
eV (k;X; e ;  ) = max
k^0;l
n
ln

r^(X; e )k + w^(X; e )l   k^0+  ln(1  l)
+cVc

(1 + ei) 1k^0; eG(X; e ;  ); + lVl (1 + ei) 1k^0; eG(X; e ;  ); o :
(33)
The functions Vc and Vl satisfy (30) and (31), respectively. Therefore, these functions are
already given. Furthermore, a comparison between the right-hand-sides in (29) and (33)
shows that eV (k;X;  ;  )  V (k;X;  ). From (29) and (33), we nd that the individual's
optimal decision-making is qualitatively the same as that in Section 5.1. This is simply
because each individual makes her decision taking the factor prices and the taxes as given.
Next, we consider the current government's decision-making. The underlying dierence
between the decision of the government and that of the individual lies in the fact that the
government recognizes that it can aect the market-clearing labor supply. In what follows,
we let elet(e ;  ) denote the market-clearing labor supply. Note that, owing to the current
government's deviation, elet(e ;  ) is a dierent function to let( ) given in (32).
We can now dene the time-consistent tax policy.
Denition 2. The sequence ftg1t=0, with t =  8t = 0; 1; 2 : : :, is the time-consistent tax
policy if
8k > 0;8t = 0; 1; 2 : : : ;  = argmaxet eV

k; k=elet(et;  ); et;  :
That is, the sequence of tax rates ftg1t=0, with t =  8t = 0; 1; 2 : : :, is the time-
consistent tax policy if any selves of the government can not obtain a strictly positive
welfare gain by their unilateral one-shot deviation from  . Solving the above maximization
problem, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The time-consistent tax policy  = (w;  i) is given by
w = 0;  i =

1 + 

1  c
c
l
1  l   1

:
Accordingly,  r is given by  c i.
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Proof. See Appendix F.
Since both the saving tax rate and the wage income tax rate turn out to be constant
over time under the time-consistent tax policy, the saving rate and labor supply are given
by the pair (set( ); let( )). The following results follow as a corollary of Proposition 7.
Corollary 1. In the RCE with a time-consistent tax policy  ,
1. (set( ); let( )) = (ssp; lsp);
2.  i Q 0 if and only if c R l.
Proof. Property 1 is shown to be true in the proof of Proposition 7 (see Appendix F).
Property 2 of this corollary is straightforward from Proposition 7.
The rst property means that under the time-consistent tax policy,  , the allocation
by the social planner is replicated on the RCE path. Then, the second property shows
that the individual's savings must be subsidized (taxed) when c > (<)l. This result is
intuitive given that, in the RCE, each individual's saving rate is excessively low (high) if
she discounts future consumption at a lower (higher) rate than she does future leisure.
Finally, we must discuss whether the government can move the equilibrium in the
correct direction by implementing such a time-consistent policy. If c > l, the answer
is undoubtedly yes, because Proposition 5 shows that the realized allocation by the social
planner attains higher welfare for all selves of the individual than does the laissez-faire
allocation. Thus, the implementation of the time-consistent tax policy improves the welfare
of all selves (i.e., the policy is Pareto improving).
However, if l > c, the answer is less clear, because the realized allocation by the
planner and that in the RCE are not Pareto ranked. As in Section 4.3, we focus on the
case of c < l < l. Then, from Proposition 6, we nd that the time-consistent tax policy
in Proposition 7 is desirable for the selves of the individual in earlier periods, but not in
later periods. This is because, as explained in Section 4.3, the taxation on their earlier
selves' savings reduces their assets, which, in turn, reduces their welfare.
Then, is the laissez-faire allocation really favorable for the future selves? The laissez-
faire allocation in the RCE, described in Section 3, is no longer time consistent once we also
consider the benevolent government's decisions. To see why, rst note that the laissez-faire
allocation in the RCE is feasible by setting t = (0; 0)8t  0. However, from Proposition
4, such a policy is undoubtedly time inconsistent. Since V sp(k) > V e(k), for all k > 0,
a self in any period strictly prefers the allocation designed by the social planner once she
actually faces a decision-making opportunity. Then, it is optimal for the government in
this period to impose a tax on her savings.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We propose a simple neoclassical growth model in which an individual's non-unitary dis-
counting induces preference reversals. We rst characterize the recursive competitive equi-
librium, and then show that the equilibrium allocation in our model is observationally
equivalent to the allocations obtained in standard geometric discounting models and quasi-
hyperbolic discounting models. However, this does not mean that the ndings in our model
have been already indicated. Rather, from the normative point of view, we derive the fol-
lowing new results which are summarized as follows.
First, a self in any period strictly prefers the planning allocation to the laissez-faire al-
location, provided the state variable has the same value. Therefore, our welfare properties
dier from those of previous studies, but the observational equivalence across the models
means we must be cautious when judging the performance of the market mechanism. Sec-
ond, if we focus on the overall equilibrium paths of the planning and competitive economies,
the following two cases arise. If the individual discounts future leisure more steeply than
she does future consumption, the planning allocation dominates the laissez-faire alloca-
tion in the Pareto sense. However, if the reverse is true, the selves in the earlier periods
strictly prefer the planning allocation, but in later periods, strictly prefer the laissez-faire
allocation. Thus, a conict arises among the dierent selves of the individual. Third, the
time-consistent tax policy designed by a benevolent government replicates the planning
allocation. This means that the time-consistent tax policy is desirable for the selves of
the individual in earlier periods, but not so in later periods. Thus, when there are no
commitment mechanisms, it is dicult to resolve this conict.
Our approach using non-unitary discounting is exible enough to allow for some exten-
sions. First, it will be fruitful to consider other goods, the future consumption of which
potentially exhibit non-unitary discounting. For example, the relationship between durable
and nondurable goods, or that between a consumption good and the individual's health
status could be characterized in this way. Second, introducing heterogeneity among indi-
viduals could provide additional insight into the welfare implications presented here. For
instance, one type of individual might discount future leisure more steeply, while another
discounts future consumption more steeply.11 If these two types of individuals coexist, our
result on the desirability of a policy intervention will change. Introducing and analyzing
such aspects are left for future research.
11In their continuous-time model without capital accumulation, Futagami and Hori (2010) show that the
behaviors of all such agents can be observationally equivalent.
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7 Appendices
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
To avoid confusion, we let r(X) = r, w(X) = w, and G(X) = G. The rst-order conditions
of the problem in (8) with respect to k0 and l are respectively given by
1
rk + wl   k0 = c
@Vc(k
0; G)
@k0
+ l
@V (k0; G)
@k0
; (A.1)
w
rk + wl   k0 =

1  l : (A.2)
The proof follows using the method of \guess and verify" for the value functions, Vj(k;X)
(j = c; l), and that for the law of motion of the aggregate capital{labor ratio, G(X).
Specically, we make the following guess:
Vj(k;X) = aj + bj lnX + dc ln(k + 'X) 8j = c; l; G(X) = sAX:
Using the above guess for Vj(k;X), we can rewrite (A.1) as follows:
k0 + 'X 0 = 	(dc; dl)
 
rk + wl   k0 ; (A.3)
where the function 	(dc; dl) is dened as
12
	(dc; dl)  cdc + ldl: (A.4)
Substituting (A.2) and X 0 = G(X) = sAX into (A.3) yields13
k + w [(1 + )l   1] + 'G = 	w(1  l):
The above equation provides l as a function of k and X:
l = l(k;X)  1  
1 +  +	
rk + w + 'G
w
= 1  
1 +  +	
r
w
(k + ('; s)X); (A.5)
where function ('; s) is dened as
('; s)  w + 'G
rX
:
Since (r; w) are given in (3) and G is given by sAX,  is reduced to
('; s) =
1  + 's

:
12Hereafter, its arguments are omitted.
13We use the fact that k0 = rk +  1w [(1 + )l   1] holds from (A.2).
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Substituting (A.5) into (A.2) yields
c = c(k;X)  r
1 +  +	
(k + X): (A.6)
Then, substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into the budget constraint and rearranging the terms,
we obtain
g(k;X) = rk + wl(k;X)  c(k;X)
=
	r
1 +  +	
(k + X)  'G(X): (A.7)
Thus, once the values of 	 and  are determined, the functional forms of l(k;X) and
g(k;X) are determined accordingly. Since 	 and  are functions of dj , ', and s, we now
consider derivations of Vj(k;X) and G(X).
Note that from (A.6) and (A.7), it follows that g(k;X)+'G(X) = 	c(k;X). Therefore,
from the functional equation, (9), we obtain the following relationship:
ac + bc lnX + dc ln(k + 'X)
= acc + (1 + cdc) ln c(k;X) + cbc lnG(X) + cdc ln	:
From (A.6) and the guess for G(X), a comparison of the coecients of both sides leads to
bc =  (1 + cdc)(1  ) + cbc; dc = 1 + cdc; ('; s) = ';
which results in
bc =   1  
(1  c)(1  c) ; dc =
1
1  c ; ' =
1  
  s : (A.8)
Following the same procedure, we can obtain bl and dl, as follows:
bl =   1
1  l ; dl =
1
1  l : (A.9)
The value of s is determined from the consistency conditions, g(K;K=L) = G(K=L)L0
and l(K;K=L) = L. Lastly, we guess that, in equilibrium, the labor supply is constant
over time (i.e., L = L0). Then, from (A.7), (A.8), and G(X) = sAX, the consistency
condition is rewritten as
sL =
	
1 +  +	
(L+ ')  ('s),

L+
1  
  s

s =

L+
1  
  s

	
1 +  +	
:
The latter equation has two solutions, namely 	=(1++	) and +(1 )=L. However,
we can readily nd that the second solution must be ruled out.14 Therefore, the value of
14 To see why, suppose otherwise. Then, ' =  L holds. However, if this equation holds, (A.6) becomes
c(k; k=L) =
r(k=L)
1 +  +	
(k   l(k=L)) = 0:
That is, the amount of consumption becomes zero.
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s in the recursive equilibrium is given by the rst solution:
s = se  	
1 +  +	
:
Once s is determined, from (A.8); ' is determined as
' =
1  

1 +  +	
1 + 
: (A.10)
Thus, (A.4){(A.10) jointly show Proposition 1. 
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 3
The rst-order conditions of the problem in (17) with respect to k0 and l are respectively
given by
1
Akl1    k0 = c
@V spc (k0)
@k0
+ l
@V spl (k
0)
@k0
; (B.1)
(1  )Akl 
Akl1    k0   
1
1  l = 0: (B.2)
We make the following guess for V spj :
V spj (k) = aj + dj ln k:
From (B.1), we obtain
gsp(k) =
	(dc; dl)
1 + 	(dc; dl)
Akl1 ; (B.3)
where the 	(; ) is dened as in (A.4). Hereafter, we omit the arguments. From (B.2) and
(B.3), we obtain
lsp(k) = lsp; where lsp =
(1  )(1 + 	)
 + (1  )(1 + 	) : (B.4)
Since 	 is unknown, we substitute (B.3), (B.4), and the guess for V spj into (18) and (19):
ac + dc ln k = ln

1
1 + 	
Ak(lsp)1 

+ c

ac + dc ln

	
1 + 	
Ak(lsp)1 

;
al + dl ln k = ln(1  lsp) + l

al + dl ln

	
1 + 	
Ak(lsp)1 

:
Since the coecients of both sides must be equal, we can show that
dc =

1  c; dl = 0:
Substituting this result into the denition of 	, we have 	 = c=(1   c). Finally,
substituting the obtained value of 	 into (B.3) and (B.4), we obtain
gsp(k) = cAk
(lsp)1 ; lsp =
1  
1  + (1  c) :
This shows Lemma 3. 
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Appendix C Derivation of (22)
If the saving rate and labor supply are determined such that they are constant over time,
we calculate the utility of a self in period t as follows.
Ut =
1X
i=0

(c)
i ln[(1  s)Akt+il1 ] + (l)i ln(1  l)
	
=
1
1  c

ln(1  s) + ln(Al1 )+ 
1  l ln(1  l)
+
1X
i=0
(c)
i ln kt+i: (C.1)
From (25), we have ln kt+i = 
i ln k+ [(1 i)=(1 )] ln(sAl1 ), where k is the value of
kt, historically given for self t. Substituting this result into the last term in (C.1) yields
Ut =
1
1  c ln(1  s) +

1  l ln(1  l) +

1  c ln k +
c ln s+ lnA+ (1  ) ln l
(1  c)(1  c)
=W (s; l; k):

Appendix D Proof of Proposition 6
Let qt denote qt  ln kt. Then, from (25),
qxt = 
tq0 + (1  t)qxss; x = e; sp; (D.1)
where qxss is given by q
x
ss = lnKss(s
x; lx), from (26). Substituting (D.1) into V x(k), we
obtain V x(kxt )  Vx(t), where V : Z+ ! R is given by15
Vx(t)  
1  c [
tq0 + (1  t)qxss] +Ax:
From Proposition 4, we know that Ve(0)  V e(k0) < V sp(k0)  Vsp(0) always holds.
Moreover, since we are considering the case of c < l < l, Ve(T ) > Vsp(T ) as T ! 1.
Finally, subtracting Ve(t) from Vsp(t) yields
Ve(t)  Vsp(t) = (1  
t)(qess   qspss)
1  c +A
e  Asp:
Since the value of t decreases as t increases, Ve(t0) Vsp(t0) > Ve(t) Vsp(t), for all t0 > t,
if qess   qspss > 0. Note that this condition is automatically satised for the case of l > c.
Thus, there exists a unique T  > 0, such that Ve(t) > Vsp(t) if and only if t  T . This
proves Proposition 6. 
15Z+ = f0; 1; 2; : : :g represents the set of all non-negative integers.
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Appendix E Proof of Lemma 7
Throughout Section 5.1, we focus on the case of  being time invariant. Therefore, we omit
the argument  . Furthermore, for the same reason given in Appendix A, we let r^(X) = r^
and w^(X) = w^. The rst-order conditions of the problem in (29) with respect to k0 and l
are respectively given by
1
r^k + w^l   k^0 =
1
1 + i

c
@Vc(k
0; G)
@k0
+ l
@V (k0; G)
@k0

; (E.1)
w^
r^k + w^l   k^0 =

1  l : (E.2)
Next, we dene the following new variable:
'^ = (1 + i)':
We make the same guess for Vj and G as in Appendix A. Using (E.1), (A.3) is now given
by
k^0 + '^X = 	

r^k + w^l   k^0

: (E.3)
Note that equations (E.2) and (E.3) are equivalent to (A.2) and (A.3), respectively. There-
fore, we have
l = l(k;X)  1  
1 +  +	
r^
w^
(k + ^X); (E.4)
c = c(k;X)  r^
1 +  +	
(k + ^X); (E.5)
k^0 = g(k;X)  	r^
1 +  +	
(k + ^X)  '^G; (E.6)
where
^  w^ + '^G(X)
r^X
=
(1  w)(1  ) + (1 + i)'s
(1  r) :
From (E.4){(E.6), we can verify that k0+'X 0 = (1+i) 1g(k;X)+'G(X) = 	c(k;X)=(1+
i) holds. Therefore, for bj and dj (j = c; l), we can obtain the same values as those in the
RCE. On other hand, from ^ = ', we have
' =
(1  w)(1  )
(1  r)  (1 + i)s: (E.7)
Finally, substituting the denition k0 = (1+i) 1k^0 and (E.6) into the consistency condition,
(1 + i)
 1g(k; k=L) = G(k=L)L, we have
sL =
	(1  r)
(1 + i)(1 +  +	)
(L+ ')  's; (E.8)
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which results in
s =
1  r
1 + i
	
1 +  +	
:
On the other hand, from (28) and the guess that G(X) = sAX, r is given by
r =  w(1  ) + is

: (E.9)
Substituting this into the above equation, we have
s = set( )  	(+ (1  )w)
	 + (1 + )(1 + i)
: (E.10)
Finally, substituting the result back into (E.7) and (E.9), we have
' = 'et( )  (1  w)(1  )
+ w(1  )  set( ) ; r = r( ) =  
w(1  ) + iset( )

: (E.11)
Thus, (E.4){(E.6), (E.10), and (E.11) jointly prove Lemma 7.
We can obtain (32) from the consistency condition L = l(k; k=L;  ). More specically,
substituting (E.4) into this condition, we rst have
L =
(1  w)(1  )(1 +  +	)  (1  r)'
(1  w)(1  )(1 +  +	) + (1  r) :
Then, substituting (E.10) and (E.11) into the above equation, and rearranging the terms,
we obtain
L = let() =
(1  w)(1  )(1 +  +	)
(1 + )[(1 + set( )i) + (1  w)(1  )(1 + 	)] ; (E.12)
which is equivalent to (32). 
Appendix F Proof of Proposition 7
We guess that eG(X; e ;  ) = esAX;
where es is still to be solved. Note that by the current government's deviation, (E.8) is no
longer valid, since L0 = L does not hold in this deviation period.
Since the pair of tax rates after this period is always given by  , the equilibrium value
of L0 is let( ). Therefore, (E.6) and the consistency condition now provide the following
equation, instead of (E.8):
eslet( ) = 	(1  er)
(1 + ei)(1 +  +	)(L+ ')  's: (F.1)
On the other hand, by imposing  = e and the labor market equilibrium in the next
period, L0 = let( ), on (27), we obtain
err(X)K + eww(X)L+ ei eGL0 = 0, er+ ew(1  ) + eieslet( ) = 0: (F.2)
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From (E.7), (F.1), (F.2), and the consistency condition, l(k; k=L) = L, the values of es,
', L, and er are determined as the functions of e and  . Their values are denoted byeset(e ;  ), e'et(e ;  ) elet(e ;  ), and er(e ;  ), respectively.
Given k and the current government's tax policy, e , the market-clearing for the con-
sumption good in this period requires
k0 = eset(e ;  )Ak(elet(e ;  ))1 ; c = (1  eset(e ;  ))Ak(elet(e ;  ))1 :
On the other hand, in the next period, given k0 and  , it follows that
k0 + 'X 0 = (1 + 'et( )=let( ))k0:
Substituting these results into (33), we have
eV k; k=elet(e ;  ); e ;  = ln h 1  eset(e ;  )Ak(elet(e ;  ))1 i+  ln1  elet(e ;  )
+ c (bc + dc) ln
heset(e ;  )Ak(elet(e ;  ))1 i
+	 ln(1 + 'et( )=let( )) + cac + lal;
where bc and dc are given in (A.8). Note that, from the same equation, bl + dl = 0 is
veried.
From the above equation, we nd that e aects V only through eset and elet. This means
that obtaining V by choosing e can also be achieved directly by choosing eset and elet. The
rst-order conditions for s and l are, respectively, given by
c(bc + dc)
s
=
1
1  s; (F.3)
(1  )[1 + c(bc + dc)]
l
=

1  l : (F.4)
Let (s; l) denote the solutions to (F.3) and (F.4). Substituting (A.8) into (F.3) and (F.4),
we can explicitly obtain the values of s and l as
s = c; l =
1  
1  + (1  c) : (F.5)
Then, we can obtain the time-consistent tax policy  by solving s = eset( ;  ) and
l = elet( ;  ) for  . Since eset( ;  ) = set( ), and elet( ;  ) = let( ), for all  , substituting
(E.10) and (E.12) (or (32)) into (F.5) yields the following two equations:
s = set( ), c = 	(+ (1  )w)
	 + (1 + )(1 + i)
;
l = let( ), 1  
1  + (1  c) =
(1  w)(1  )(1 +  +	)
(1 + )[(1 + ci) + (1  w)(1  )(1 + 	)] :
From the former equation, we have
1 + i =
	
(1 + )c
[1  c + w(1  )=] :
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From the latter equation, we have
1 + i =
(1  c)	
(1 + )c
  w
c

1  c

+
(1  c)	
1 + 

:
Then, from the above two equations, we have w = 0 and  i =
1  c
(1 + )c
	  1. From the
denition of 	 in Proposition 1, we then have
 i =

1 + 

1  c
c
l
1  l   1

:
Finally, substituting w = 0 and s
et( ) = c into (E.9), we obtain  r =  c i. 
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